Once upon a time it was assumed that speaking literally and directly is the norm and that speaking nonliterally or indirectly is the exception. The assumption was that normally what a speaker means can be read off of the meaning of the sentence he utters, and that departures from this, if not uncommon, are at least easily distinguished from normal utterances and explainable along Gricean lines. The departures were thought to be limited to obvious cases like figurative speech and conversational implicature. However, people have come to appreciate that the meaning of a typical sentence, at least one we are at all likely to use, is sentences mean and what speakers mean in uttering them? Does it lead to a major modification, or perhaps even outright rejection, of the semantic-pragmatic distinction? I think 1 To keep matters relatively simple, I will generally limit the discussion to declarative sentences. These are the ones that are, or were, generally thought uncontroversially to express propositions. I will not worry about imperative, interrogative, and more marginal sorts of sentences. I will also assume, perhaps controversially, that declarative sentences are not marked for assertion (or for constative use, to borrow the generic term from speech act theory) in the way that imperative sentences are marked for directive use (for issuing orders, making requests, or giving advice) and interrogative sentences are marked for asking questions.
not. This platitude does not support the radical-sounding views that go by names like 'contextualism' and 'truth-conditional pragmatics'.
I have long accepted a certain picture, inspired partly by Austin and mostly by Grice, of what is involved in language and communication. In my judgment this picture captures both the conventional and the rational (intentional and inferential) ingredients of communication. It provides a basis both for accepting the autonomy of linguistic semantics and for appreciating the complex, creative, and cooperative nature of what people do in speaking to and in understanding one another. It accentuates the importance of a number of fundamental distinctions, which often get blurred, confused, or even ignored. I will begin by sketching this picture of language and communication. Then, in its support, I will offer some simple arguments for ten points.
2
The collective upshot of these arguments is that the older conception of the relation between what sentences mean and what speakers mean in uttering them is in better shape than has lately been supposed. Not only that, the semantic-pragmatic distinction holds up against the now widely recognized fact that what speakers mean generally goes beyond sentence meaning and does so in ways that not long ago were not even contemplated. I can sum up very simply the rationale behind my allegiance to this older conception. First, the Contextualist Platitude does not require a radical reconstrual of semantics, at least not if we take the meaning of a sentence to be determined compositionally by the meanings of its constituents in a way that is predictable from how its constituents fit together syntactically. 3 However, since
for some sentences what is thus determined does not yield a complete proposition, it cannot be assumed that the output of a semantic theory is a set of truth conditions for all the (declarative) sentences of the language. But there is no reason to assume that. late, I'm late," but didn't add "for a very important date," he still would have said something, even though he didn't say what he was late for. He could be accurately reported as having said that he was late. Similarly, without the distinction between saying something and meaning something we would have to deny that speakers say anything at all when speaking figuratively. If a disorganized administrator says to his assistant, "You are the CPU of this department," he really is saying that the assistant is the CPU of that department, even though computers, not departments, have CPUs.
Third, contemporary enthusiasts for contextualism trade on a number of ambiguities involving such terms as 'say', 'mean', 'refer', 'utterance', 'context', and 'interpretation' (see the Appendix for a list of these tricky terms and their dual uses). One especially pernicious ambiguity is displayed by the phrase 'utterance interpretation', which is often used by those who wish to replace sentence semantics with truth-conditional pragmatics. While using this phrase to mean the psychological process whereby listeners figure out what speakers are trying to communicate, some contextualists use it as if it meant something more abstract, something akin to semantic interpretation. That is, they treat utterance interpretation as if it were a mapping from syntactic structure to utterance contents, except that the mapping is sensitive to broadly contextual factors. 5 In so doing, they seem to think that an utterance (as opposed to a sentence) can express things independently of what the speaker means in making it, and treat utterances almost as if they are agents.
The Picture: Language and Communication
For the sake of discussion, let's make the simplifying and rather artificial assumption that utterances are always utterances of complete, grammatical sentences. 6 Then we can focus on sentences and utterances of them. In my view (see Point 1), we should attribute semantic properties to sentences and pragmatic properties to utterances. 7 The reason for this is simple:
taken as properties of sentences, semantic properties are on a par with syntactic and phonological properties -they are linguistic properties -whereas pragmatic properties belong to acts of uttering sentences in the course of communicating. This conception of the semantic-pragmatic distinction is inspired by, indeed is a generalization of, Grice' s point that what a speaker implicates in saying what he says is carried not by what he says but by his saying it -and sometimes by his saying it in a certain way (1989, 39) . 8 The speaker's act of uttering a sentence is what brings extralinguistic information into play.
9
Then there is Austin's distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts, between saying something and doing something in saying it. This distinction is easy to overlook. That is partly because the word 'say' plays a dual role as a locutionary verb and as an illocutionary one, roughly synonymous with 'state' (or 'assert'). In the locutionary sense, one can say something without stating it (or performing any other illocutionary act whose content is what one says ). One might not be stating anything, or one might be speaking figuratively and be stating something else, though not expressly. The illocutionary act a speaker performs in saying something depends on his communicative intention. 10 What he means in saying what the units of communication are utterances of individual sentences. Though simplifying, this assumption does not imply that what speakers can communicate in uttering a sentence, or what their listeners take them to be communicating, does not depend on the previous discourse. Also, I will focus on spoken language, indeed faceto-face utterances at that. Presumably, though, the same basic principles that govern face-to-face communication govern other sorts of communication as well, even though in those cases the participants generally have less information to go on, about the communicative setting and about each other.
7 I am supposing that utterances are acts of producing tokens of sentences. Uttered sentences have semantic properties; acts of uttering them do not (of course, speakers' communicative intentions have contents). As for tokens of uttered sentences, they have the semantic properties of the sentences of which they are tokens; they have no semantic properties of their own. Any seemingly semantic properties of tokens are really pragmatic properties of utterances. These depend entirely on the communicative intentions of speakers; semantic properties of sentences and their constituents do not.
8 I should note that although I agree with Grice that what is said in uttering a sentence is closely correlated with the meanings of the sentence's constituent expressions and how they are put together syntactically, I do not accept his view that saying something entails meaning it. If one i s not speaking literally, one is still saying something, even though one means something else. Also, his Grice's conception of what is said did not countenance the case in which a sentence does not express, even relative to the context, a complete proposition. See Bach 1994, 141-4 , for discussion of Grice's conception and my reasons for modifying it.
9 I formulate, motivate, and defend my conception of the semantic-pragmatic distinction in Bach 1999. 10 Here I depart from Austin (1962) , who assimilated all illocutionary acts to the regularized ones performed in special institutional or social settings, and follow Strawson (1964) Here is a pair of simple examples. A surgeon says to his wife, "I am going to cut the front lawn." For all that he says, he could mean that he will take a scalpel and use it to cut a number of blades of grass, but of course he does not mean that. His wife, relying on stereotypical knowledge of lawn mowing, presumes that if he did mean that, he would have said more (see Point 6). So she rightly takes him to mean that he will cut the whole lawn with a lawnmower.
Later he comes inside, hears the tea kettle screaming for a while and finally goes into the kitchen. Surveying the damage, he finds his wife, tells her she forgot to turn off the stove, and adds, "The tea kettle is completely black." For all that he says, he could mean that the tea kettle is black all over, rather than at least partly of some other color. But his wife takes him to mean that the tea kettle, which they mutually know to be made of aluminum, has been completely blackened as a result of the mishap in the kitchen. 11 Much attention has been paid to the processes involved in understanding utterances, but little has been paid to the production side, to how we manage to say what we say. Maybe this is because we don't really have a clue about this process works, except in the simplest case, in which you utter a sentence whose semantic content is precisely what you are trying to convey, or, as it is casually said, you "put your thoughts into words." The thing is, though, we rarely do that. Psycholinguists who study language production generally assume, or at least pretend, that we generally do. Making this grossly simplifying assumption still leaves them with plenty to worry about. Even if speech were just a matter of putting a thought into words (perhaps by translating from the language of thought into a natural language), the task of explaining what is involved in speaking would still be daunting. When we have something to say, we need to come up with some linguistic means for saying it: a sentence. We need to recover lexical items and a syntactic form by which to say it, to know what sounds to produce, and to know how to produce them. These stages or levels of speech production are all areas of active psycholinguistic investigation (see Levelt 1989 for a comprehensive survey of the problems under study, and a well-developed approach to them). But the fact is that speaking is rarely a straightforward matter of putting a thought into words, however difficult even this is to explain.
mean on the basis of what we say, given the circumstances in which we say it, the fact that we said that rather than something else, and the presumption that we said it with a recognizable intention. How we manage to make ourselves understood and how we manage to understand others are very complex processes which, like most cognitive processes, are far beyond the reach of contemporary psychology to explain. As theorists, the best we can do is speculate on some of the features of these processes, most notably what it takes to implement Grice's discovery that communication involves a distinctively reflexive intention (and its recognition).
Specifically, the intention includes, as part of its content, that the audience recognize this very intention by taking into account the fact that they are intended to recognize it. semantics at all (at least construed as that part of grammar that delivers sentence interpretations). The relevant task, it is thought, is to give a theory of something called "utterance interpretation," not quite psychological but not merely semantic. It is sometimes thought to concern the processes whereby hearers interpret utterances and sometimes to concern something more abstract, analogous to semantic interpretations of sentences but without having to be projections of syntactic structure. The p icture of language and communication sketched above should suggest why, even though I accept the Contextualist Platitude, I am against the idea of utterance semantics, but there are direct arguments against it.
One such argument is due to David Kaplan, who stresses the importance of not confusing utterances with sentences-in-contexts. Focusing on the role of semantics in explaining entailment and formal validity, he points out obvious problems that arise, on an u tterance semantics, due to utterances of sentences containing indexicals or demonstratives. For example, noting that "utterances take time, and [one speaker's] utterances of distinct sentences cannot be simultaneous" (1989a, 546), Kaplan argues that utterance semantics would get the wrong results. He proposes a somewhat idealized conception of context to make allowances for sentences that can be true but cannot be truly uttered ('I am not uttering a sentence'), sentences (or sequences of sentences making up an argument) that take so long to utter that their truth values can change during the course of the utterance, and sentences that are too long to utter at all. For different reasons, utterances of sentences like 'I know a little English' or 'I am alive' are likely to be true, even though their contents are not true in all contexts. For, as Kaplan points out, using 'I say nothing' to illustrate, "there are sentences which express a truth in certain contexts, but not if uttered " (1989b, 584) . Similarly, utterances of sentences such as 'I don't know any English' and 'I am deceased' are likely to be false, even though these sentences can still express truths relative to some contexts. These facts can be explained only if semantic contents are assigned to sentences-in-contexts (where contexts here are construed more abstractly than as contexts in which sentences are actually uttered), not to utterances.
Kaplan's arguments are nice, but they exploit special features of particular sentences. There is a more general reason for rejecting utterance semantics. Consider that utterances are often nonliteral, in which case a speaker says one thing and means something else instead (also, many utterances are indirect -even if the speaker means what he says, he means something else as well). For example, one might say 'I could eat a million of those chips' and mean something a bit more realistic. Now surely it is not the business of semantics to account for the contents of utterances that are not literal, since in such cases the speaker is trying to convey something that is not predictable from the meaning of the uttered sentence (or, if it is ambiguous, from its operative meaning). Obviously not just anything that a speaker means, no matter how far removed it is from what the sentence means, counts as semantic content, and the semantic content of the sentence is the same whether an utterance of it is literal or not. So semantic content is a property of the sentence, not the utterance. After all, the fact that the sentence is uttered is a pragmatic fact, not a semantic one.
Moreover, the only respect in which an utterance has content over and above that of the uttered sentence is as an intentional act performed by a speaker. 13 And in that respect, the content of an utterance is really the content of the speaker's communicative intention in is yielded. But requiring a truth condition for every sentence conflicts with the other conception of semantics, on which the semantic content of a sentence is a projection of its syntax. In my view, we need to opt for this second conception. To do so is not to give up semantic compositionality but only to abandon the dogmatic assumption that every 13 As explained in note 7, I am taking utterances to be acts of uttering sentences, not the tokens of sentences thereby produced. Sentence tokens do not have semantic properties independently of the sentence types of which they are tokens.
(declarative) sentence has a truth condition (relative to a context). 14 Nor does it require, on the grounds that utterances of (declarative) sentences that do not have truth conditions do have truth conditions, changing the subject matter of semantics from sentences to utterances. We merely need to recognize that when speakers utter semantically incomplete sentences, they must mean something that includes an element that does not correspond to anything in the syntax of the sentence.
Saying something is one thing, stating or otherwise meaning it is another.
Austin's distinction between "locutionary" and "illocutionary" acts, between saying something and doing something in saying it, is commonly neglected these days. Perhaps that is because it is so easy to use 'say' interchangeably with 'state' (or 'assert'). But stating or asserting is a case of performing an illocutionary act, of meaning and trying to communicate something, and that goes beyond mere saying (in the locutionary sense).
Why is the locutionary notion of saying needed, along with the correlative, strictly the question of what is said in each of these cases. In the first case, allowances have to be made for (the verbal side of) such activities as acting and translating. The need to provide for the second and third cases is obvious. As for the last case, suppose someone speaks 14 Given the phenomenon of semantic incompleteness, it is not generally feasible to give the semantics of sentences, by means of T-sentences, in terms of truth conditions. For example, if 'Steel isn't strong enough' is semantically incomplete, then the T-sentence 'The sentence "Steel isn't strong enough" is true iff steel isn't strong enough' is semantically incomplete too. It is more feasible to specify the semantics of such a sentence in terms of its propositional content, whether or not complete. I call the contents of semantically incomplete sentences 'propositional radicals' (Bach 1994, 127) means that he wants to be presented with, within a short time, a ready to eat, uncontaminated taco of a normal size. But obviously he doesn't say most of this, and the sentence he uses is not an elliptical version of some more elaborate sentence that spells these things out. This phenomenon is so pervasive that we tend not to notice it, not just when engaged in ordinary conversation but even when theorizing about language and communication.
To begin to appreciate this point, just glance at some examples of sentences taken out of context, in this case from newspaper articles or letters to the editor.
(1) It could have been worse.
(2) We regret any confusion.
(3) Water is a matter of public debate.
(4) The information really helped show us where there were holes in the system.
(5) San Francisco is less of a problem because we have more aggressive code enforcement.
(6) Requiring the use of barbless hooks, recycling fishing line, and posting signs in multiple languages that describe how to properly unhook birds would diminish the problem.
In each case, it should be obvious that something is missing in what is said, relative to what the writer meant, but what that is is not at all obvious.
18
We generally don't make fully explicit what we mean in uttering a sentence, even when we're using the individual words in them literally. Then for every sentence we do utter, there is a more elaborate, qualified version we could utter that would make what we mean more explicit. However, these are not the sentences we do utter. Indeed, they are not ones we even think to utter. Surely we don't form a thought to express, think of an elaborate sentence to express it with, and then, in the interests of conversational efficiency, work out a stripped down version of the sentence to use instead. Whatever qualifications or disclaimers the writers of the above sentences may have intended, surely convoluted sentences expressing them didn't first come to their minds, only to then to be edited.
The semantic content of a (declarative) sentence cannot be equated with what it is normally used to assert.
Offhand, one might think that for any sentence, the most likely use of that sentence is a literal one. However, this is not true of most sentences we use. Indeed, a great many sentences are very hard to use literally, even if one uses the individual words and phrases in them literally.
Normal uses of the following sentences illustrate what I call sentence nonliterality (Bach 2001b ). In each case, what a speaker is likely to assert includes the contents of the italicized parenthetical words, even though these are not parts the sentences being uttered.
18 Note that to say that the utterance is taken out of context does not show that context provides the missing elements. See Point 9.
(7) Alice hasn't taken a bath (today).
(8) Barry and Carrie went to Paris (together).
(9) The especially if there is some one sort of context which we tend to imagine it being used in. To keep one's semantic judgments from being pragmatically contaminated, it is always a good idea to imagine a variety of contexts of use, even wildly improbable ones.
Pragmatic regularities give rise to faulty "semantic" intuitions.
Some philosophers think that explaining semantic intuitions is the job of semantics. One would have thought that its job is to explain semantic facts, for which intuitions are merely evidence. In my view, there is no particular reason to suppose that such intuitions are reliable and robust or, indeed, that they are responsive mainly to semantic and not to pragmatic facts. 19 A great many more sentences are not used at all, and most of those are not even feasible to use. See Point 7.
Moreover, there is no reason to suppose that such intuitions play a role in the process of communication.
Now according to the previous point, the semantic content of a (declarative) sentence is not to be identified with what it would normally be used to assert. Not only that, since our intuitions about the semantic contents of sentences tend to be geared to what they're used to assert, our intuitions are biased toward typical uses rather than literal uses. 20 To appreciate this reconsider the examples listed above and some variations on them.
(7) a. Alice hasn't taken a bath.
b. Alice hasn't taken a bath today.
c. Alice hasn' t taken a bath since she found a dead rat in the tub. • If the speaker could have made a stronger statement, he would have.
• If the speaker needed to have been more specific, he would have.
• If there was something special about the situation, the speaker would have mentioned it.
However, if what the speaker actually said is obviously not strong or specific enough but it is obvious how he could have explicitly made it stronger or more specific, he does not need to do so. It is presumed that additional information, were it mentioned, would have needed to be mentioned. In both reasoning generally and in rational communication in particular, we presume that things are not out of the ordinary unless there is reason to think that they are, and we presume that if there is such reason, this would occur to us (see Bach 1984) . So, as
Stephen Levinson puts it, "If [an] utterance is constructed using simple, brief, unmarked
forms, this signals business as usual, that the described situation has the expected, stereotypical properties" (2000, 6) . Otherwise, as he goes on to say, "If, in contrast, the utterance is constructed using marked, prolix, or unusual forms, this signals that the described situation is itself unusual or unexpected or has special properties." 22 Also, to make fully explicit what one means, when one could speak much more economically and exploit the default assumptions that in fact obtain in the circumstances in which one is speaking, would not only take an effort and be boring, it would be misleading.
So there is no need, at least not in general, to expect semantics to explain what people would normally mean in uttering a given sentence. One shouldn't let features of stereotypical utterance contexts get incorporated into the semantics of a sentence. Nor should the fact that the utterance of a given sentence is likely to have a certain intuitive content not obviously 22 Levinson identifies three pres umptions or "heuristics" that yield defeasible inferences as to a speaker's communicative intention (2000, 31-34):
• Q-heuristic: what isn't said, isn't.
• I-heuristic: What is simply described is stereotypically exemplified.
• R-heuristic: What's said in an abnormal way, isn't normal.
These are closely related, respectively, to Grice's (1989, 25-6 ) first maxim of quantity ("Make your contribution as informative as is required", second maxim of quantity ("Do not make your contribution more informative than is required?"), and maxim of manner ("Be perspicuous," and specifically to the submaxims "Avoid obscurity of expression" and "Avoid prolixity").
projectible from its form automatically elicit an explanation in terms of more subtle elements of form. Although there may be special cases that require semantic explanation, grounded in syntax or in lexical structure, these are only specia l cases. Generalizing from these cases leads to an overgeneration problem -more structure, hence more meaning or more meanings, than most sentences really have. Similarly, there is no need for an expansive notion of what is said, on which what is said is not entirely predictable from the semantic content of the sentence.
Focusing on sentences representative of those we use or might use is to commit a massive sampling error -even unusable sentences have semantic contents, however unintuitive.
Most of the (English) 
What is said (in the locutionary sense) matters even though understanding an utterance often does not require entertaining or representing it.
Four reasons were given under Point 2 above for the need for a strictly semantic notion of what is said. However, neglecting such reasons some (e.g., Recanati 1995 , and Carston 2002 
Context does not literally determine what is said or what is meant.
It is often casually remarked that what a speaker says or means in uttering a given sentence "depends on context," is "determined" or "provided" by context, or is otherwise a "matter of 
Breakfast Anyone?
To appreciate what context doesn't do, let's revisit a commonly discussed example and examine it more closely. The discussion will also revisit some earlier points about intuitions. This is relevant because it is often claimed that our intuitions correctly recognize the contribution of context to what is said.
(15) I haven't had breakfast.
The usual line on this example is that someone who utters it on a given day says that they (15) is uttered, many will say, yes, there is a difference: the speaker of (15) didn't say that he hadn't had breakfast that day. That's because he left this for inference (notice that this inference is much harder to make if (15) is uttered late in the day).
It might be replied that the speaker of (15) didn't explicitly say that he hadn't had breakfast that day. That is, he didn't spell out the relevant time period. But why suppose that this was said at all? Of course, it was what the speaker meant in saying what he said, but he just didn't quite say it and left it for his audience to figure out. Is that so hard to accept?
Evidently.
All right. Then presumably someone who utters (16), the positive version of (15), on a particular day, says that they have had breakfast that day. In uttering (17a) a speaker wouldn't be saying that he has filed his tax returns that day. That year is more like it, but he not saying that either. In uttering (17b), he wouldn't be saying that he has eaten caviar that day. Probably what he means is that he has eaten caviar before. And if he uttered (17c), surely he wouldn't be saying (or meaning) that he has had breakfast in bed that day. So context doesn't determine what he does mean.
Moreover, it is easy to imagine circumstances, however improbable, in which someone who utters (15) does not mean that he hasn't had breakfast that day. Here are a few such circumstances.
• the speaker works the graveyard shift and utters (15) to a co-worker shortly after midnight
• it is common to have breakfast at work, even if one has already had it at home
• people are permitted to have breakfast only one day each week
• having breakfast is illegal I neglected to mention why philosophers are inclined to insist that in uttering (15) a speaker says that he hasn't had breakfast that day, and not that he hasn't had breakfast, period.
They are appalled at the alternative. Surely, they maintain, he didn't say that he hadn't ever had breakfast or that he hadn't previously had breakfast. But of course he didn't say either of those things (he didn't utter any such word). He said that he hadn't had breakfast, period.
Objectors who complain that it is just counterintuitive to suppose that the speaker of (15) is something more relevantly specific, that he has had breakfast that day.
Demonstratives and most indexicals do not refer as a function of context -they suffer from a character deficiency.
The reference of so-called pure indexicals, such as 'I' and 'today', is determined by their linguistic meanings as a function of specific contextual variables (this is context in the narrow, semantically relevant sense). However, the reference of other indexicals and of demonstratives is, as Perry puts it, "discretionary" rather than "automatic," and depends on the speaker's intention, not just on "meaning and public contextual facts" (2001, (58) (59) . That is, the speaker's semantic intention is not just another contextual variable, not just one more element of what Kaplan calls "character" (1989a, 505) . The fact that this intention determines the referent does not imply that the specification of the meaning of a discretionary indexical or a demonstrative contains a parameter for the speaker's intention. Rather, given the meaning of such an expression, in using it a speaker must have some intention in order to provide it with content relative to the context in which he is using it.
It is a separate question whether the audience can identify the referent (assuming the speaker is using the expression referentially). In order to ensure that, the speaker needs to take mutually salient contextual information into account in forming his intention. It is natural to suppose that in (18a) 'he' refers to the cop and in (18b) to the robber. It is natural all right, but not inevitable. The speaker of (18a) could be using 'he' to refer to the robber, and the speaker of (18b) could be using it to refer to the cop. Such speakers would probably not be understood correctly, at least not without enough stage setting to override 24 See Neale 1990 , ch. 5. King 2001 shows likewise for complex demonstratives (demonstrative phrases of the form 'that F').
commonsense knowledge about cops and robbers, but that would be a pragmatic mistake.
Nevertheless, the fact that 'he' could be so used indicates that it is the speaker's semantic intention, not the context, which determines that in (18a) it refers to the cop and in (18b) to the robber. The same point applies to these examples with two anaphora:
(19) a. A cop arrested a robber. He took away his gun.
b. A cop arrested a robber. He used his gun.
c. A cop arrested a robber. He dropped his gun.
d. A cop arrested a robber. He took away his gun and escaped.
In (19a), presumably 'he' would be used to refer to the cop and 'his' to the robber, whereas in (19b) both would be used to refer to the cop, in (19c) both would be used to refer to the robber, and in (19d) 'he' would be used to the robber and 'his' to the cop. However, given the 26 25 An unarticulated constituent does not correspond to anything in the syntax of the sentence but is nevertheless thought to be part of "what is expressed" by an utterance of the sentence. An alternative approach, which does not fall under the heading of "contextualism" or "truth-conditional pragmatics," is to posit hidden variables in the syntax, variables whose values are somehow "contextually provided." Although there are special cases, such as relative adjectives and nouns like 'local', 'foreign', 'neighbor', and 'disciple', for which this approach is plausible, freely positing hidden variables just to insure that the semantic contents of sentences (relative to contexts) are complete propositions is unwarranted. And it is certainly not needed to account for the propositions that speakers are likely to convey.
26 Grateful thanks to Lenny Clapp, C. Bill Jones, John MacFarlane, Patrick Rysiew, Jenny Saul, and two anonymous readers for alert corrections and valuable suggestions, most of which I heeded.
• set of salient mutual beliefs and presumptions among participants at a stage in a conversation determine • make the case (constitutive determination)
• ascertain (epistemic determination) 
